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NOTES
the more tender sensibilities only as the likelihood of these sensi-
bilities being offended decreases.
Kenneth D. McCoy, Jr.
TORTS - TRESPASS BY MUNICIPALITY - PUNITIVE EFFECT OF
DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING
Defendant municipality constructed streets on plaintiff's
property without her consent and without expropriation pro-
ceedings for which plaintiff brought an action to recover the
value of the land taken and additional compensation for mental
anguish resulting from the illegal trespass. The trial court
awarded damages for both the trespass and mental anguish. The
Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit affirmed. Held, a munci-
pality which takes property without expropriation proceedings
is liable to the landowner for trespass damages which include
damages for mental anguish as well as for the value of the land
taken. Belgarde v. City of Natchitoches, 156 So. 2d 132 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963).
Indemnification for mental anguish and suffering has never
presented the problem in the civil law that it has at common
law. French jurisprudence has had no difficulty in making such
awards for torts when the mental suffering has been real and
serious.1 The original position at common law was to disallow
recovery unless accompanied by some established tort,2 but there
is a growing trend toward recognition of the infliction of mental
suffering as a separate tort.3 Although Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2315 and 19344 correspond substantially to French Civil
Code articles 1382 and 1149-1151, respectively, Louisiana's orig-
inal position on damages for mental suffering did not adhere to
the French interpretation; but it has since undergone a develop-
ment similar to that of the common law. Mental anguish occa-
1. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 252 (1959).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 2, at 40 (2d ed. 1955) ; 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LE-
GAL LIABILITY 460, 470 (1960) : "The treatment of any element of damages as a
parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A
factor which is today recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely
a question of social, economic and industrial needs as those needs are reflected
in the Organic law."
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
4. LA, CIVIL CODE arts. 2315 and 1934 (1870).
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sioned by a trespass was recognized early in a case in which
defendant utility company stripped limbs from trees located on
plaintiff's land." Later cases have affirmed this decision ;" and
it is now well settled in Louisiana, as at common law, that dam-
ages for mental suffering are actual rather than punitive and,
when occasioned by a trespass, are compensatory for the viola-
tion of a recognized property right.7
The civil law recognizes neither nominal8 nor punitive dam-
ages. 9 On the other hand, the common law allows at least nomi-
nal damages for every trespass10 and punitive damages where it
5. Tissot v. Great Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 39 La. Ann. 996, 3 So. 261
(1887).
6. Bright v. Bell, 113 La. 1078, 37 So. 976 (1905) ; Givens v. Town of Ruston,
55 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) ; Oglesby v. Town of Winnfield, 27 So. 2d
137 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
7. McGee v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 206 La. 121, 131, 19 So. 2d 21, 24 (1944):
"We see no reason why damages for mental anguish or suffering can not be re-
covered in addition to property damage. Mental anguish or suffering is a dis-
tinct element of damages and is not merely an incident to be taken into considera-
tion in addition to a pecuniary loss suffered by reason of a wrongful or negli-
gent injury to persons or property."
Mental suffering became more closely linked with trespass in Hernandez v.
Harson, 237 La. 389, 401, 111 So. 2d 320, 324 (1958), when the court said: "It
is true that there is no proof of malice nor was the seizure characterized by harsh-
ness and total disregard to the interests of plaintiff. Yet it was illegally and
wrongfully executed . . . sufficient to have caused mortification, annoyance and
physical discomfort."
'Iii Loeblich v. Garnier, 113 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) the court
recognized the punitive effect of damages awarded for mental suffering caused
by the violation of a property right. "The often found general statement that
only compensatory and not punitive damages are awardable in Louisiana is in
apparent conflict with the awards often made for damages for mental anguish
and embarrassment caused by an illegal and deliberate violation of property rights
or for such violation itself irrespective of any pecuniary damage caused thereby
... . The key to resolution of this conflict seems to be that in such circum-
stances such awards in Louisiana are regarded as compensatory for violation of
a recognized property right, rather than punitory." Id. at 103. Accord, Roge v.
Kuhlman, 136 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
In the case of Breaux v. Simon, 112 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) the
trial court allowed $250 for an illegal trespass of the city on land owned by the
plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was pointed out that punitory dam-
ages were not recoverable in Louisiana. The case was remanded to the court of
appeal, which deleted the $250 punitory damages. On rehearing, however, the
court decided that this award was not punitory but was compensatory "for this
unauthorized expropriation of his private property to public use." Id. at 125.
8. E.g., Tan Te v. Bell, 27 Philippine 354 (1914) ; Algarra v. Sandejas, 27
Philippine 284 (1914) ; contra, Griner v. Stracner, 172 La. 538, 134 So. 737
(1931); Gumpert v. Werlein, 149 La. 840, 90 So. 215 (1921) ; Bourdette v.
Sieward, 107 La. 258, 31 So. 630 (1902) ; Lamartiniere v. Rachal, 131 So. 2d
340 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Walker v. J. J. Ellis Lake Providence Corp., 107
So. 2d 550 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
9. Gugert v. New Orleans Independent Laundries, 181 So. 653 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1938) ; 6 PLANIOL ET RnxERT, TRAImt' PRATIQUE E DROIT cIviL FRAN-
VAis no 681 (1930) ; 7 id. no 855; SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 355 (9th ed. 1912).
10. E.g., Fletcher v. Howard, 226 Ky. 258, 10 S.W.2d 825 (1928) ; Giddings
v. Rogalewski, 192 Mich. 319, 158 N.W. 951 (1916) ; Forest City Cotton Co. v.
Mills, 218 N.C. 294, 10 S.E.2d 806 (1940) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (2d ad. 1955).
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is intentional, wilful, or wanton." In 1830 punitive damages
were awarded in a Louisiana case for trespass in the absence of
any special damages,12 and similar awards were made in other
cases involving malice or bad faith.18 Punitive damages were
justified as a deterrent to repetition of illegal conduct. 4 In 1917
the Louisiana Supreme Court abrogated these decisions by inter-
preting Civil Code articles 2315 and 193415 to restrict tort recov-
ery to compensation for actual damage. 6 Even the common law
denied municipal liability for punitive damages.' 7
11. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Sanders, 87 Miss. 607, 40 So. 163 (1906) ; Schu-
macher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App. 361, 165 S.W. 1142 (1914);
Oden v. Russell, 207 Okla. 570, 251 P.2d 184 (1952) ; Huling v. Henderson, 161
Pa. 553, 29 Ati. 276 (1894) ; contra, e.g., Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198
Mass. 538, 84 N.E. 1018 (1908); Bee Publishing Co. v. World Publishing Co.,
59 Neb. 713, 82 N.W. 28 (1900).
12. Carlin v. Stewart, 2 La. 73 (1830).
13. Summers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 151 (1836) ; Ostrica Oyster Co. v. Barbier,
8 Orl. App. 425 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1911) ; cf. Tiblier v. Alford, 12 Fed. 262
(E.D. La. 1882); Townsend v. Fontenot, 42 La. Ann. 890, 8 So. 616 (1890);
Marin v. Scatterfield, 41 La. Ann. 742, 6 So. 551 (1889) ; Leen Kee v. Smith
Bros., 35 La. Ann. 518 (1883) ; Carter v. Tufts, 15 La. Ann. 16 (1860).
14. Tiblier v. Alford, 12 Fed. 262 (E.D. La. 1882) ; Black v. Carroilton R.R.,
10 La. Ann. 33, 40 (1855).
15. Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541
(1917).
LA. CVM CODE art. 2315 (1870) : "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
Id. art. 1934: "Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of
the loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been deprived,
yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating alto-
gether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party.
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual en-
joyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some convenience or other
legal gratification although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet
damages are due for their breach; a contract for a religious or charitable founda-
tion, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of the fine
arts, are objects and examples of this rule.
"In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offenses,
quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge orjury, while in other cases they have none, but are bound to give such damages
under the above rules as will fully indemnify the creditor, whenever the contract
has been broken by the fault, negligence, fraud, or bad faith of the debtor."
16. Bacharach v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 212 F. Supp. 83 (E. D. La. 1963)
Breaux v. Simon, 235 La. 453, 104 So.2d 168 (1958), transferred to 112 So.2d
121 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So.2d
599 (1949) ; Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So. 2d 457 (1948) ;
Janssen Catering Co. v. Abadie, 157 La. 357, 102 So. 428 (1924) ; Trenchard v.
Central Laundry Co., 154 La. 1003, 98 So. 558 (1923) ; Hanna v. Otis, 151 La.
851, 92 So. 360 (1922) ; Douglas, Burt & Buchanan Co. v. Texas & P. By., 150
La. 1038, 91 So. 503 (1922) ; Mente & Co. v. Kaplan, 146 La. 678, 83 So. 895
(1920) ; Howell v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 144 La. 427, 80 So. 613 (1919) ; Burt
v. Shreveport Ry., 142 La. 308, 76 So. 723 (1917) ; Serio v. American Brewing
Co., 141 La. 290, 74 So. 998 (1917) ; cf. Marr, The Punitive Damages Heresy,
2 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1917) ; Note, 1 LA. L. REv. 226 (1938).
17. E.g., Larson v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307 (1884) ; Fisher v. Miami,
160 So. 2d 57 (Fla. App. 1964) ; Chicago v. Langlass, 52 Ill. 256 (1869) ; Ben-
nett v. Marion, 102 Iowa 425, 71 N.W. 360 (1897) ; Desforge v. West St. Paul,
231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950); Lineberger v. Greenville, 178 S.C. 47,
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In the instant case the court equated compensatory damages
for mental suffering with damages for the violation of a recog-
nized property right.'8 However, greater emphasis was placed
on the property violation than on mental suffering. No doubt
the trespass could have caused some mental anguish; but, since
the property probably could have been expropriated in any
event, the seriousness of such distress is subject to some ques-
•tion. It seems that compensation for mental anguish was per-
haps a means used by the court to give a punitive effect to dam-
ages awarded for a trespass. The court reasoned that if no
more damages were awarded than the value of the land, the ex-
propriation proceedings would become useless formalities.
The instant case appears to be a judicial attempt to insure
that municipalities use proper expropriation proceedings. The
* imposition of punitive damages, however, has been the subject
of much controversy. 19 Besides contradicting the established
jurisprudence of Louisiana and the general common law rule,
punitive damages in the instant case would probably not have
the desired punitive effect.20 To place damages as punishment
182 S.E. 101 (1935). Some jurisdictions have made municipalities liable for puni-
tive damages by statute. Coffee County v. Parrish, 249 Ala. 226, 30 So. 2d 578
(1947) ; Myers v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 215 (1871) ; Earle v. Greenville County,
215 S.C. 539, 56 S.E.2d 348 (1949) ; Wright v. Butte, 64 Mont. 362, 210 Pac. 78
(1922). Other jurisdictions have held a municipality liable for punitive damages
if it had in some way ratified the illegal acts of its officers. Cf. Lawton v. John-
stone, 123 Okla. 145, 252 Pac. 393 (1926) ; Willett v. St. Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38
Atl. 72 (1897).
18. 156 So. 2d at 134: "The plaintiff had prayed for damages for the humilia-
tion, worry and mental anguish arising from the illegal trespass upon her prop-
erty. This type of damages resulting from an illegal trespass onto a landowner's
property is regarded under Louiisana jurisprudence as compensatory damages to
which the landowner is entitled for the violation of a recognized property right
through the trespass."
19. The advocates of the theory of punitive damages point out that they serve
constructive purposes in redressing petty cases of outrage or oppression which
would otherwise go unpunished and in compensating for actual expenses of litiga-
tion, such as counsel fees. McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 7 (1935); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 2 (2d ed. 1955) ; SEDowIcK, DAMAGES § 354 (9th ed. 1912) ; Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAs~v. L. REv. 1173 (1931). See also Morris, Rough
Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. Ruv. 730 (1930).
PROSSER, TORTS § 2, at 10: "It has been condemned as undue compensation
of the plaintiff beyond his just desserts in the form of a criminal fine which
should be paid to the state, if anyone, with the amount fixed only by the caprice
of the jury and imposed without the usual safeguards thrown about criminal pro-
cedure, such as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and even the rule against double jeopardy - since the defend-
ant may still be prosecuted for the crime after he has been mulcted in the tort
action." McCoRMicK, DAMAGES § 77; SEDGwicK, DAMAGES § 353; Willis, Measure
of Damages When Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22
HARv. L. REV. 419, 420 (1909) ; contra, Aldrige, The Indiana Doctrine of Exem-
plary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IIn. L.J. 123 (1945).
20. It has been suggested that punitive damages against a municipality would
tend to better training and control of its servants. If such damages became fre-
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on a municipality is to place it on the taxpayers who are the
very ones to benefit from the admonishment of the wrongdoer. 21
Also, if punitive damages are designed to punish outrage, malice,
or evil motive, there is serious doubt that a municipal corpora-
tion, as such, can act maliciously or wilfully.22 It is also recog-
nized that defendant's ability to pay is a proper element in de-
termining punitive damages since what may be severe punish-
ment to one of small means would be insignificant punishment
to one of great wealth.23 What verdict would constitute a pun-
ishment on the body politic with its enormous ability to tax?
Robert L. Roshto
quently assessed against a city, public sentiment and the pressure of political
campaigns could possibly force its officials to heed their warning.
21. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1204
(1931) ; Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 903, 910 (1951).
22. Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 116 (1858) ; Wilson v. Granby, 47 Conn.
59 (1879) ; Doyle v. Sandpoint, 18 Idaho 654, 112 Pac. 204 (1910) ; Newton v.
Wilson, 128 Miss. 726, 91 So. 419 (1922) ; Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N.H.
387 (1870).
23. Jackson v. Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722 (1924) ; Perez-Sandi v.
Berges, 12 La. App. 191, 125 So. 185 (1929) ; Gallman v. Young, 6 La. App.
137 (1927). See SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES 745 (1883): "But when exemplary
damages are claimed a different question is presented. The defendant's pecuniary
ability is then a matter for the consideration of the jury, on the ground that a
given sum would be much greater punishment to a man of small means than to
one of larger." In Louisiana this point has twice received comment. Janvier,
Punitive Damages in Louisiana, 10 LOYOLA L. REv. 26 (1929) ; McMahon, Dam-
ages Based Upon What the Traffic Will Bear, 11 LOYOLA L. REv. 115 (1930).
